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Bond Rating Agencies and Stock Analysts:
Who Knows What When?
ABSTRACT
Both bond rating agencies and stock analysts evaluate publicly traded companies and
communicate their findings and opinions to investors. This study compares the timeliness of
each and explores Granger causality between the two. We find that bond rating downgrades are
partially a response to information which both the market and earnings analysts already have and
which they have already impounded in prices and earnings forecasts respectively. However,
downgrades are also viewed by both earnings analysts and market participants as providing some
new information - the market reacts negatively and analysts revise their forecasts sharply
downward. Indeed, the reaction of earnings analysts to downgrades exceeds their response to
other informational events as documented in previous studies. We find that the post-downgrade
earnings forecast revisions are partially predictable from the market response to the downgrade
but find no evidence that the market response is partially predictable from the pre-downgrade
earnings forecast revisions. While the market apparently views upgrades as providing no new
information, since there is no market response to the announcement, we find that stock analysts
tend to revise their earnings forecasts upward following upgrades. However, these upward
revisions are much smaller than the downward revisions following downgrades.
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Bond Rating Agencies and Stock Analysts:
Who Knows What When?
Both bond rating agencies and stock analysts evaluate publicly traded companies and
communicate their findings and opinions to investors - in the form of bond ratings in the case of
the former and in the form of earnings forecasts (among others) in the case of the latter. Since
stock prices have been shown to react to both rating changes and revisions in analysts’ earnings
forecasts, it is apparent that both rating agencies and financial analysts bring some information to
the market. What is less clear is exactly what information each provides and when. This paper
attempts to fill in this gap in our knowledge by examining: (1) changes in analysts’ earnings
forecasts before and after bond rating changes by Moody’s over the period 1984-1990 and (2) the
market reaction to those rating changes.
Previous studies of bond ratings and analysts’ earnings forecasts have established the
following:
1. The stock market reacts negatively to announcements of bond rating downgrades (see
Holthausen and Leftwich (1986), Hand, Holthausen, and Leftwich (1992), Wansley and
Clauretie (1985), Cornell, Landsman, and Shapiro (1989), and Matolcsy and Lianto
(1995)).
2. There is no evidence of a stock market reaction to announcements of bond rating upgrades
(same references).
3. Bond rating downgrades (upgrades) tend to occur following periods of negative (positive)
abnormal returns (Holthausen and Leftwich (1986), Wansley and Clauretie (1985),
Matolcsy and Lianto (1995)).
4. The market reacts to both upward and downward revisions in analyst earnings forecasts (for a
review see Givoly and Lakonishok(1984); see also Lys and Sohn (1990)and
Stickel(1991)).
1
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5. Upward (downward) revisions in analyst earnings forecasts tend to occur after firms have
experienced positive (negative) abnormal returns (e.g., Lys and Sohn (1990), Abarbanell
(1991).
6. All stock analysts do not revise their earnings forecasts at the same time. Forecast revisions
are (1) negative on average, and (2) positively correlated with previous revisions by other
analysts (O’Brien (1988), Brous (1992)).
It is apparent from 1 and 4 that both rating downgrades and earnings forecast revisions
bring some new information to equity markets.] It is apparent from 3,5, and 6 that both ratings
and earnings forecasts also tend to lag the market - to represent in part a reaction to information
which the market already has. Neither ratings nor earnings forecasts are updated continuously.
The most thorough ratings analysis occurs in conjunction with new bond issues. After issuance,
the ratings are updated quarterly or on the receipt of important information (which the market
and earnings analysts should normally have also) but it appears that these update analyses are
less thorough (Ederington and Yawitz, 1987). Earnings forecasts also appear to be updated with
a lag. According to the Institutional Broker’s Estimate System (IBES) tape, only 15-20°/0 of
analysts update their forecasts in an average month. While many of these revisions are bunched
around important information releases, others are spread out over time. Consequently, it is an
open question whether ratings or earnings forecasts are more timely.
In addition, to being more or less timely, rating changes could reflect information
unavailable to earnings analysts. The bond rating agencies claim to receive inside information,
such as minutes of board meetings, profit breakdowns by product, and new product plans, which
are unavailable to stock analysts and which the rating agencies claim to hold in confidence
(Ederington and Yawitz, 1987). They claim that a "Chinese wall" prevents even their own stock
analysts from having access to this information. It has been suggested, e.g. Ederington (1 992 ),
2
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that the rating format, that is the use of letter ratings to communicate opinions, serves as a way to
communicate the relevant aspects of this inside information to potential creditors without at the
same time revealing the information itself to competitors. Consequently, changes in bond ratings
could lead financial analysts to change their earnings forecasts if they conclude that the rating
change likely reflects inside information unavailable to them. In addition, earnings analysts
could revise their forecasts because they think the rating change will
interest costs.
Our primary concern in this paper is with Granger Causality.
cause" Y if X is useful in predicting future values of Y - specifically
affect the firm's future
X is said to "Granger-
if X adds information
beyond that contained in the set of past values of Y. If rating changes Granger-cause earnings
forecast revisions, but not the reverse, then we should observe negative (positive) earnings
forecast revisions following downgrades (upgrades) and no pattern in forecast revisions prior to
the rating changes as illustrated in Panel a of Figure 1. If analysts’ forecasts Granger-cause
rating changes, then there should be no discernible pattern in earnings forecasts following the
rating change but negative (positive) revisions in earnings forecasts should be observed prior to
downgrades (upgrades) as illustrated in Panel b. If Granger Causality runs both ways, then
negative (positive) earnings forecast revisions will be observed both before and after downgrades
(upgrades) as illustrated in Panel c, and if neither Granger-causes the other, no earnings revision
pattern should be observed either before or after rating changes - Panel d. Note that "Granger
causation" is defined in a predictive sense only. In other words, a finding that rating changes
"Granger cause" earnings forecast revisions would mean that rating changes predict earnings
forecast revisions but does not preclude that both are a response to other public information so
we also explore this issue.
Our analyis of forecast revisions around rating changes may help explain why the market
reacts to downgrades but not upgrades. If the hypotheses that the differential response to
3
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downgrades and upgrades arises because companies voluntarily release favorable information but
are reluctant to release unfavorable information or because the rating agencies expend more
resources in detecting deteriorations in credit quality than improvements, then stock analysts’
forecasts should adjust more fully prior to upgrades than prior to downgrades.
Finally, we are interested in (1 ) whether the market reaction to a downgrade
announcement is conditional on pre-downgrade earnings forecast revisions, and (2) whether post-
downgrade earnings forecast revisions are predictable from the stock market reaction to the
downgrade announcement. We hypothesize that a downgrade which occurs after a series of
downward earnings forecast revisions will be primarily a response to negative information which
the market already has and will have less information content than a downgrade which follows
stable or rising earnings forecasts. Consequently, we expect the market response to be small in
this case. On the other hand, if the market response to a downgrade is large (small), it would
indicate large (small) information content and we would expect the post-downgrade forecast
revisions to be large (small). To our knowledge, ours is the first paper to test whether the market
reaction to an informational event is conditional on pre-event earnings forecast revisions and the
first to test whether post-event earnings forecast revisions are conditional on the market reaction.
In the following section, we explain our data and test for Granger Causality between
rating changes and analysts’ earnings forecasts. In section 11, we examine the market response to
rating changes and test (1) whether the market response is conditioned by prior forecast
revisions, and (2) whether the post-rating-change earnings revisions are partially predictable
from the market response to the rating change. Conclusions are summarized in section III.
I. Rating Changes, Earnings Forecast Revisions and Granger Causality.
For this analysis, we collected data on all corporate bond rating changes by Moodys
between January 1, 1984 and December 31, 1990- a total of 1554. Of these, the IBES tapes
4
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contain earnings forecasts surrounding 1260. Like Brous (1992), Lys and Sohn (1 990) and
the stock price. Specifically,
(1)
,
earnings per share for the current fiscal year and Pi* is the price per share six months prior to the
rating revision. 2 For inclusion in our sample, we require that the IBES tape contain earnings
forecasts for the firm from twelve months prior to the rating change through six months after.
Since previous studies have shown that the IBES tapes contain data errors, we eliminate a
firm/rating change from our sample if FRi,t is more than ten standard deviations (defined over all
firms) from the overall mean in any month. After the initial round of data eliminations, the
standard deviation is recalculated and again firms with observations outside ten standard
deviations are eliminated. The resulting data set consists of 753 downgrades and 401 upgrades.
Mean values of FR before and after rating changes are reported in Table I with t-values in
parentheses. As shown there, large and significant negative revisions in analysts’ earnings
forecasts are observed both prior to and after downgrades (Panel A) while there is no significant
pattern either before or after upgrades (Panel B).
However, it is dangerous to draw conclusions about Granger causality from the raw
figures in Table I since both the bond rating agencies and earnings analysts could be responding
with a lag to earlier formation releases. Specifically, if the large negative earnings forecast
revisions observed prior to downgrades are due to negative information coming to the market,
then the negative post-downgrade earnings forecast revisions could represent a lagged response
to this earlier information - not the downgrade. Fortunately, prior studies indicate that this
5
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lagged response is predictable. O’Brien (1988), Brous (1992), Lys and Sohn (1990), and Kang,
O’Brien, and Sivaramakrishnan (1994) have found that, since all analysts do not update their
forecasts each month, revisions in the median earnings forecast tend to be serially correlated, that
is, if the median forecast rises (falls) one month as some analysts revise their forecasts in
response to new information, it will tend to continue to rise (fall) the next month as other
analysts update. Based on this, we can forecast the expected post-rating-change response to pre-
rating-change information. In addition, previous studies find that earnings analysts tend to be
overly optimistic initially and lower their forecasts as the earnings release date approaches -
which suggests that the figures in Table I are biased downward as measures of the surprise
revision since negative revisions would be expected even in the absence of any new information.
To isolate surprise revisions we employed two variants of the procedure pioneered by
Brous (1 992) and Brous and Kini (1993) who examine earnings forecast revisions following
stock offerings and takeovers respectively. To implement our first procedure (Model 1), we first
chose 500 firms at random from the IBES data tape and then chose at random a 25 month period
for each firm between 1/84 and 12/90. Using this pooled data, we estimated the following six-
month third-order polynomial distributed lag (t-values in parentheses):
The significant negative intercept of - .0931 confirms the prior finding that, ceteris paribus,
analysts tend to reduce their forecasts overtime .3 The significant coefficients on the lagged FR's
confirm the finding that, ceteris paribus, downward (upward) revisions in the median forecast
tend to be followed by futher downward (upward) forecast revisions as more analysts update.
The coefficients for the first three lagged months are approximately .1 indicating that a doubling
of the median forecast one month tends to be followed by an increase of approximately 10% in
6
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each of the following three months. After three months, the revisions are smaller but still
Significant.4
difference between the actual revision in the median forecast in month t and the expected forecast
revision given the observed forecast revisions over the last six months, specifically
(3)
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A. Post-downgrade Results
Mean abnormal (or surprise) forecast revisions for the months surrounding downgrades
are reported in Panel A of Table 11 and cumulative abnormal forecast revisions formed by
summing the AFR's from t-6 through t+6 are shown in Figure 2a. As expected, the post-
downgrade AFR's in Table II are considerably smaller than the FR's in Table I indicating that
part of the post-downgrade forecast revisions documented in Table I represent a lagged response
to pre-downgrade information releases and the tendency for analysts to lower their forecasts over
time. On the other hand, for both Models 1 and 2, negative abnormal earnings forecast revisions
are observed in each of the six months following bond rating downgrades. The cumulative AFR
for months +1 through +6 estimated using Model 1 is -2.67 (t=-9.23) while -1.795 (t=-4.32) is
the Model 2 estimate.6 The largest revision is observed in the month after the downgrade and it
is significant at the .01 level for both models. Many of the AFR's for later months are significant
as well. These results indicate that bond downgrades Granger-cause downward revisions in
earnings forecasts, i.e., that earnings analysts view downgrades as having negative implications
for earnings.
The AFR's which we observe following downgrades are considerably larger than those
observed by Brous (1992) following announcements of new equity issues and by Brous and Kini
(1993) following takeover announcements - suggesting that earnings analysts view downgrades
as having stronger implications for future earnings than either of those announcements. For
instance, the sum of the AFR's for months +1 through +3 is -1.55 for our Model 1 and -1.09 for
our Model 2 versus -.49 in Brous (1992) and. 15 in Brous and Kini (1993 ).7 For a P/E ratio of 12
(the approximate mean in our sample), our Model 2 results in Table II imply an abnormal
forecast revision of approximately -6.9% in the first month following a downgrade and
approximately -13. 10/0 over three months. The results also indicate that many earnings analysts
8
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are far from timely since significant abnormal forecast revisions are still being observed four
months after the downgrade.
While we have attempted to remove the impact of pre-downgrade information releases,
some readers may not be convinced that we have adequately done so and may suspect that our
post-downgrade surprise forecast revisions still represent a lagged response to pre-downgrade
information releases - not a response to the downgrade itself. To explore this possibility, we
examine two other samples. First, from the IBES tapes, we choose at random 364 non-
downgrade firms with a cumulative FR for months t-6 through t-1 (prior to a randomly chosen
pseudo event date, t) approximately equal to that of our downgrade sample in Panel A of Table I
- specifically a cumulative FR between -2.83 and -6.83 (average -4.4). In other words, we form a
sample of firms which apparently were the subject of similar negative pre-t news but which did
not suffer a downgrade at t. The resulting cumulative AFR's after applying Model 1 are graphed
in Panel a of Figure 3. While the pre-month-0 FR's are roughly the same as those in Panel a of
Table 2, the post-month-O results are not. The mean AFR's for months O through 6 vary around
zero and are all insignificant. In summary, once we control for the tendency for earnings
analysts to respond with a lag to new information, we do not observe negative post-t AFR's
unless the negative information is followed by a downgrade.
Second, we examined separately those downgrades without large negative pre-downgrade
AFR's, i.e, firms which apparently were not the subject of negative information in months t-6
through t-1. For this, we ranked our downgrade sample according to the cumulative Model 1
AFR from t-6 through t-1. Starting with the largest positive pre-downgrade AFR, we placed
firms in this subsample until we had obtained a subsample with an average cumulative pre-
downgrade AFR of approximately zero. The results for this subsample, which are shown in
Panel b of Figure 3, mimic those of the entire sample. All the mean post-downgrade AFR's are
negative and significant at the .01 level. In summary, analyst forecast revisions following a
9
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downgrade appear to be roughly the same whether or not the downgrade was preceded by other
negative news. Both of these results support the conclusion that our procedures do control for
the tendency for analyst forecasts to respond with a lag so that the negative AFR's observed after
downgrades do represent a response to the downgrade and not a lagged response to pre-
downgrade information.
B. Pre-downgrade Results
As shown in Table II Panel A and Figure 2 Panel a, pre-downgrade results differ
somewhat depending on whether the AFR's are defined using Models 1 or 2. When the AFR's
are defined using Model 1, significant negative abnormal earnings forecast revisions are
observed each month prior to downgrades indicating that negative earnings forecast revisions
also tend to Granger-cause downgrades. This is consistent with the evidence of Holthausen and
Leftwich (1986) and others in which negative stock returns are observed prior to rating
downgrades and indicates that downgrades are at least partially a response to public information
which earnings analysts and the market already have. However, when Model 2 is used to define
the AFR's, the pre-downgrade AFR's are much smaller and most are insignificant (although all
are negative). The cumulative AFR from month -6 through month -1 is -2.44 using Model 1 (t=
-1 0.56) but only -0.50 (t= -1.13) using Model 2. In other words, most of the pre-downgrade
forecast revisions in months -6 through -1 are predictable given the forecast revisions in months -
12 through -7 using Model 2. To check whether the difference between the Model 1 and Model
2 results is due to the difference in the two samples (since we required data from t-24 through
t+24 for Model 2), we applied Model 1 to the Model 2 sample. The results indicate that part of
the difference is due to difference between the two samples and part to a difference in the
estimated parameters of the distributed lag equations. In summary, it is clear that downgrades
10
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Granger-cause earnings forecast revisions. Whether earnings forecast revisions also Granger-
cause downgrades is less clear.
C. Upgrades
Evidence on upgrades is presented in Panel B of Table II and in Panel b of Figure 2.
While the results in some individual months differ, Models 1 and 2 yield very similar results
overall. Specifically, our results indicate that rating upgrades Granger-cause upward revisions in
earnings forecasts but that these upward revisions are small relative to the downward forecast
revisions associated with downgrades. The cumulative AFR from month+ 1 through month +6 is
0.39 (t=3.09) for Model 1 and 0.71 (t=3.69) for Model 2. While significant, these cumulative
positive revisions are less than l/3rd the cumulative negative AFR's observed following
downgrades. Moreover, several of the post-upgrade AFR's for individual months are not
significant and a couple (Model 1) are negative. Using either model, we also observe weak
evidence of positive abnormal earnings forecast revisions prior to upgrades. The cumulative
AFRs for the (-6,-1) period are .44 (t=2.88) for Model 1 and .57 (t=2.73) for Model 2, but few
individual months are significant and some are negative. In summary, our evidence indicates
that Granger-causality runs both ways around upgrades. However, both the pre- and post-
upgrade revisions in analysts’ earnings forecasts are small. Clearly, earnings analysts (like the
market) respond more strongly following downgrades than following upgrades.
D. Regression evidence
In addition to our analysis of the mean AFR's defined using Models 1 and 2, we also
conduct a regression test of the response of earnings analysts to downgrades and upgrades.
Specifically, we estimate:
11
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(4)
where Ddwi,s=l if a rating downgrade is announced in months and zero otherwise and Dup i,s=l if
an upgrade is announced in months and zero otherwise. The hypothesis that, ceteris paribus,
analysts tend to lower their forecasts over time implies a0 <0 and the hypothesis that the FRs are
correlated because only a portion of the analysts update monthly implies aj >0 for j= 1,5. The
hypothesis that downgrades Granger-cause negative earnings forecast revisions implies b j<0
while the hypothesis that upgrades Granger-cause upward forecast revisions implies g j >0.
Equation 4 is estimated using pooled data from t-24 through t+24 for all firm/rating-changes with
data over this period. As in equation 2, the a j's are estimated using a third-order polynomial
distributed lag.
Results are shown in the first two columns in Table III. As expected, a0 < 0 and a j> 0
for j=l,5. All b j are negative, the five b 's are significant as a group at the .01 level,8 and three of
the five are individually significant at the .01 level. This further indicates that downgrades
Granger-cause earnings forecast revisions. According to the estimated equation, the largest
earnings forecast revision is observed in the month immediately following the downgrade. For
the mean P/E ratio in our sample (12), the coefficient of -.5788 for Ddwi,t.l implies that earnings
forecasts are reduced an average of 6.9% in the first month following a downgrade and the other
coefficients imply a cumulative reduction of 13.2% after three months relative to firms with a
similar forecast revision pattern in months t-6 through t-1 but no downgrade.
In Figure 4, we chart the cumulative earnings forecast revision implied by the Table III
results for firms which do and do not experience a downgrade. For months -6 through O we plot
the cumulative FR's for downgraded firms from Panel A of Table I. For months +1 through +6,
12
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we plot the cumulative FR's implied by the coefficient estimates in Table III (regression 1) and
the Table I values for the lagged FR's. Consequently, the solid line represents the cumulative FR
for firms which experience downgrades while the dotted line represents the estimated cumulative
FR for firms which were the subject of similar negative news in months -6 through O but which
were not downgraded.9 While negative forecast revisions are implied for both, clearly the
implication is that the downward revisions in analysts’ earnings forecasts are much greater if
Moodys downgrades the fro’s debt.
The coefficients for the upgrade dummies are smaller and only the dummies for months t-
1 and t-2 are significant at the .05 level. However, all five upgrade coefficients are positive and
the five are significant as a group at the .01 level (F=3.276 versus a critical value of 3.02). The
estimates imply an upward abnormal earnings forecast revision of approximately 2.2% the first
month following an upgrade and a cumulative 6.7°/0 after three months. Again the implication is
that upgrades Granger-cause upward revisions in analysts’ forecasts but that the reaction is not as
strong as the reaction to downgrades.
Using this regression approach, we also test whether analysts’ reactions to a rating change
are conditioned by (1) how closely the firms is followed by analysts and (2) whether the analysts
have been raising or lowering their forecasts prior to the rating change. First, we hypothesize
that if the firm is closely followed, as evidenced by a large number of analyst earnings forecasts
on the IBES tapes, then rating changes will be largely anticipated by analysts and the post
downgrade or upgrade earnings forecast revisions will be smaller. For the firms in our sample,
the median number of analysts whose forecasts are reported by IBES is 15. Consequently, we
define a dummy variable Di =1 if IBES reports more than 15 analyst forecasts for the firm and
Di=0 if IBES reports 15 or fewer forecasts. We then estimate the equation:
13
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Our hypothesis that the reaction to the rating change is less if many analysts follow the firm
implies q j>0 and l j<0 for all j. Results are shown in the columns labeled "Regression 2" in
Table III. There is little support for this hypothesis; only five of the ten (q and l coefficients have
the hypothesized sign and the ten new variables are not significant as a group at the .05 level.
We also hypothesize that a downgrade (upgrade) will be less of a surprise, and therefore
that the post-rating-change forecast revision will be small, if there has been a large revision in
earnings forecasts (in the same direction) prior to the rating change. To test this, we define Di= 1
if the cumulative FRi,t over the six months prior to the rating change is positive and D i=0 if the
cumulative FR is negative. We then re-estimate equation 5 using this dummy variable. Our
hypothesis implies q j <0 and l j <0. Again, there is little support for the hypothesis. Only five of
the estimated coefficients have the hypothesized sign, none are individually significant at the .05
level, and the group often is not significant. In summary, earnings analysts’ reactions to a rating
change do not appear to be conditioned on either the number of analysts following the company
or the forecast revision pattern prior to the rating change.
II. The Market Reaction to Rating Changes and the Interaction with Earnings Forecasts.
We are also interested in the market reaction to rating changes and how the market and
analyst reactions are related. We begin by conducting a standard event study to measure the
market response to rating changes. It is not possible to conduct a similar event study of the
reaction to earnings forecast revisions since (1) numerous analysts forecast each firm’s earnings
and (2) and our data does not identify revision dates. Our announcement dates (day O) are those
14
Fo
r a
n 
el
ec
tro
ni
c 
co
py
 o
f t
hi
s 
pa
pe
r, 
pl
ea
se
 v
isi
t: 
ht
tp
://
ss
rn
.c
om
/a
bs
tra
ct
=9
40
listed by Moodys in Moodys Bond Survey (MBS). Some, but not all, of these are reported in the
Wall Street Journal; if they are, it is almost always the day following that listed in MBS so our
announcement window consists of days O and +1. We eliminate a rating change from our sample
if the Wall Street Journal Index recorded another announcement by the firm during the three day
window -1 to +1. We lose a few more observations because there are no observations for the
firm on CRSP's NYSE, ASE, and NASDAQ databases and a couple because Moody’s
announcement does not occur on a market day. The resulting sample consists of 494 downgrades
and 310 upgrades.
Since both our data and previous studies have shown that downgrades tend to occur after
other bad news and when the firm’s stock has been doing poorly, we use a post-rating-change
period (day +60 through +315) to estimate a market model for each firm. These market models
are estimated using an equally weighted market index and abnormal returns are defined in the
usual manner by subtracting the expected return implied by the estimated market model from the
daily return for firm i.
Results are reported in Table IV. Consistent with earlier studies, such as Holthausen and
Leftwich (1 986) and Hand et. al. (1992), we observe a significant negative reaction to
downgrades but no reaction to upgrades. For downgrades, the two day CAR is -1 .29% with
t= -5.69, and z= -5.94. Also, 60.3% of the abnormal returns over this two-day period are
negative which is significant at the .01 level. Clearly, the market, like earnings analysts, views
most downgrades as informational events. Like these earlier studies, we also observe significant
negative abnormal returns prior to downgrades. The (-45,-1) CAR is -5. 17% with t=-4.78 and
z=-4.82. These results are consistent with our earlier finding that downgrades are generally
preceded by downward revisions in earnings forecasts and indicate that the market receives other
negative news about the firm prior to most downgrades. On the other hand, we do not observe
significant abnormal returns following downgrades. Apparently, market participants quickly and
15
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efficiently impound the information in the downgrade in market prices while earnings analysts
require several months to fully adjust their earnings forecasts. This finding is also somewhat at
odds with the recent finding of earnings drift - that the market fails to filly impound the
information in actual earnings releases.
Together with the results in the previous section, these event study findings indicate that
downgrades are partially a response to information that both earnings analysts and the market
already have but that downgrades also bring some new information to the market which is valued
by both earnings analysts and market participants. The market impounds this information almost
immediately, but earnings analysts do so only with a considerable lag.
In the case of upgrades, we observe significant positive CAR’s prior to upgrades but no
reaction to the upgrade announcement itself. The (-45,-1) CAR is 3.85% with t=5 .06 and z=5.54,
while the (O, 1) CAR is only .05% with t=.36 and z=.21. The small and insignificant (O, 1 ) CAR
is consistent with previous event studies but is somewhat at odds with our evidence in Tables II
and III where we found evidence that analysts respond to upgrades by revising their forecasts -
although not as much as they revise following downgrades. Apparently, both the bond rating
agencies and the earnings analysts are reacting to information which the market already has and
has impounded in prices. Somewhat surprisingly, there is weak evidence of small, but
significant, positive abnormal returns well after the upgrade. Although the AR’s on the days
immediately following the upgrade are small, insignificant, and of mixed sign, the (+2, +45)
CAR is 1.32% with t=l.76 and z=2.70. This could mean that the market fails to fully impound
all the information in the upgrades when they occur. However, since the (+2, +45) CAR is small
and just barely significant and since the individual AR’s from +2 through +10 are of mixed sign,
we are reluctant to conclude much from these results. In summary, most bond upgrades seem to
be a response to information which the market already has and has impounded in prices.
However earnings analysts appear to be less prompt and are still adjusting well after the upgrade.
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We hypothesize that the market reaction to downgrades is conditioned on the pre-
downgrade earnings forecast revisions. Specifically, we hypothesize that if the pre-downgrade
AFR's have been positive (negative), the downgrade will be (will not be) a surprise, and the (0,1)
CAR will be large (small) in absolute terms. To test this hypothesis, we regress the (0,1) CAR
on the cumulative (-6, -1) AFR (defined using method 2).’0 We only examine downgrades since
no response to upgrades was observed. Our hypothesis that a downgrade will be more of a
surprise and cause a larger negative (0,1) CAR if past AFR's have been positive implies a
negative coefficient. When this regression is estimated (N=382), the results are (t-values in
parentheses):
Contrary to our hypothesis, there is no evidence that the CAR is a larger negative figure if the
pre-downgrade AFR's have been positive. Downgrades appear to be a surprise whether or not
analysts have been revising their earnings forecasts prior to the downgrade.
We also hypothesis that post-downgrade earnings forecast revisions are partially
predictable from the (0,1 ) CARS. Specifically, if the (0,1) CAR is large and negative, it should
indicate that the downgrade is a surprise and is bringing new information to the market. In this
case, we expect large negative revisions in analysts’ forecasts following the downgrade. If, on
the other hand, the (0,1 ) CAR is small, it should indicate that the downgrade was not a surprise,
and we would expect little revision in earnings forecasts after the downgrade. To test this, we
regress the AFR for the month after the downgrade (+1) on the (O, 1 ) CAR. Our hypothesis
“replies a positive coefficient. We also include as an independent variable the (-45, -1) CAR to
represent the other information, besides the downgrade, coming to the market in the last two
17
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months which could also cause analysts to revise their forecasts. Positive coefficients for both
the (O, 1) and (-45,-1) CARS are hypothesized. The results are (t-values in parentheses):
indicating that earnings forecasts tend to lag the market and to be adjusted upward (downward)
following good (bad) news. The coefficient of CAR(0,1) is also positive and significant
confirming our hypothesis that earnings forecasts tend to be reduced more following downgrades
which the market finds surprising than following “non-surprising” downgrades.
III. Conclusions
We have explored the relative information provided to the equity market by bond rating
agencies and earnings analysts. We find that downgrades are partially a response to information
which both earnings analysts and the market already have and have impounded in earnings
forecasts and market prices respectively. Nonetheless, downgrades are clearly viewed by market
participants as providing some new information since negative returns are observed in response
to downgrades. Moreover, analysts apparently view the downgrades as having negative
implications for the current year’s earnings since they respond by revising their forecasts sharply
downward. Part of these post-downgrade earnings forecast revisions represents a lagged
response to the negative information which precedes most downgrades but part represents a
reaction to the downgrade itself. Moreover, the surprise forecast revision following downgrades
is stronger than the revisions which previous studies have documented following other
informational events. Our evidence indicates that the market impounds downgrade information
much more quickly and efficiently than analysts do since, while market returns show no post-
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downgrade pattern, analysts are still revising their forecasts months later. Moreover, we find that
the post-downgrade earnings forecast revisions are partially predictable from the market’s
response to the downgrade - that earnings forecasts are adjusted more sharply if the market
reaction is strong.
In contrast to downgrades, upgrades appear to be purely a response to information which
the market already has since there is no market response and since the upgrades follow both
periods of positive returns and upward earnings forecast revisions. Nonetheless, upgrades are
followed by upward revisions in analysts’ earnings forecasts. Apparently, either analysts view
the upgrades as providing positive new information or they are reacting with a lag to public
information which caused the upgrade. However, these upward forecast revisions are
considerably less than the surprise downward revisions following downgrades. It appears that
either the rating agencies expend more resources in detecting deteriorations in a firm’s financial
position than they do in detecting improvements or that the firms themselves communicate good
news, but not bad news, to the market.
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Endnotes
1. The purpose of bond ratings is to communicate information to bondholders and bad (good)
news to bondholders need not be bad (good) news to stockholders. However, Goh and
Ederington (1993) find that most downgrades reflect a downward revision in the firm's
prospective cash flows which is bad news for both. Downgrades (upgrades) could occur, not
because the rating agencies revise downward (upward) their expectations of future cash flows,
but because they revise upward (downward) their evaluations of the riskiness of that cash flow
stream. In a test of this, Chandra and Nayar (1995) use analyst earnings forecasts to determine
whether commercial paper rating downgrades are due to changes in expected cash flows or
changes in perceived riskiness. They conclude that both mild and severe commercial paper
downgrades are associated with a downward revision in earnings expectations while severe
downgrades also appear to be associated with an increase in perceived riskiness.
2. We normalize the earnings forecasts using the price six months prior to the forecast revision
to avoid picking up price changes caused by the earnings forecast revisions during our
the nearby forecasts in January and February are for the 1989 fiscal year while March’s is for the
forecasts for 1989 earnings while March’s is calculated using the February and March forecasts
of 1990 earnings.
3. For a P/E ratio of 12 (the mean in our sample), the intercept implies a negative mean revision
of -1. 10/0 each month.
4. We also estimated a model with longer lags. No lags beyond six were significant.
5. Brous (1 992) and Brous and Kini (1993) use a five-month MA model with equal weights on
each of the five lagged months. We feel that an advantage of our procedures is that the relative
weights of the most recent and more distant months are allowed to differ.
6. We skip month t since it is unclear which occurs first - the rating change or the forecast
revision. Moreover in calculating the AFR's for months after t we assume that the revisions in t
represent a response to pre-downgrade information. Consequently, the post-downgrade AFR's
will tend to underestimate (in absolute terms) the surprise forecast revision.
7. Note that it is necessary to multiply their mean AFR's by 100 to make them comparable with
our definition in equation 2. We have also duplicated Brous's MA procedure for defining the
AFR's. Using that procedure, we obtain somewhat smaller AFR's than those reported in Table 2
but they still exceed those observed by Brous and Brous and Kini.
8. For this test, we re-estimated the equation without the five Ddw variables and constructed an
F test based on the difference in the unexplained sum-of-squares.
9. Note that Figure 4 understates the true difference between firms with and without downgrades
since we force the month O forecast revision to be the same.
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10. The results are virtually the same using Model 1.
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Figure 2- Cumulative Abnormal Forecast Revisions
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Figure 3- Cumulative Abnormal Forecast Revisions
For Two Control Samples
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